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ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE PLACEMENT POLICIES:
LEGISLATIVELY PROMOTING THE BEST INTEREST OF
CHILDREN AMIDST COMPETING INTERESTS OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND EQUAL PROTECTION FOR
SAME-SEX COUPLES
Samantha R. Lyew*
INTRODUCTION
Nearly 400,000 American children are in the foster care system. 101,666 of
those children are waiting to be adopted.1 Each child comprising those statistics lacks
a permanent home, and thousands of individuals in the United States have graciously
opened their homes to accommodate them.2 The numbers continue to rise each year,3
however, and permanent placements for these children—whether it be with a foster
family or through adoption—are desperately sought, especially placements for those
so-called hard-to-place children.
Since the 1980s, the stigma associated with homosexuality has slowly eroded
as a result of LGBT advocacy groups’ efforts within both the legal and cultural contexts.4 Opportunities for same-sex couples to expand their families became available
as distinctions characterizing the traditional family unit were blurred, and popular
culture became more accepting of the non-traditional family unit.5
For same-sex couples, adoption and foster care are the most common means for
familial expansion, helping to alleviate the overburdened foster care system.6 Samesex married couples are raising an estimated 58,000 adopted and foster children,7 and

*
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1. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, ADMINISTRATION ON CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE
ANALYSIS AND REPORTING SYSTEM, FY 2012 DATA (2012), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/afcarsreport20.pdf [hereinafter THE AFCARS REPORT].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming
2016) (explaining the history and progression of the LGBT movement and its relevance to current increased
cultural acceptance of LGBT individuals).
5. Id. at 7.
6. Id.
7. Brief for Gary J. Gates as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.

186

2016]

Journal of Legislation

187

same-sex couples are more likely than opposite-sex couples to adopt foster children.8
The legal and procedural hurdles for same-sex couples seeking to adopt or foster
children vary by state and are highly dependent upon the type of agency utilized by
the couple to facilitate the placement. Agencies may be public or private and act as
intermediaries between placement families and children.9
While public agencies take a broad, more generalized approach to child placement, private agencies typically invoke a more selective process. Factors under consideration in the placement process of private agencies may include marital status,
sexual orientation, religious affiliation, and the like.10 These private agencies have
made the process more challenging for those who do not fit the traditional mold of a
Christian, heterosexual married couple, but in the wake of landmark cases such as
Obergefell v. Hodges11 and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,12 the religious and moral objections underlying the selective processes employed by these agencies have been
challenged. Concurrently, states have been working to further their own policy objectives through such processes as legislation and popular referendum.13 State treatment of same-sex couples seeking to foster or adopt children falls across the spectrum—from one extreme prohibiting child placement with same-sex couples, to
treading a middle ground of indifference, to the opposite extreme promoting child
placement with same-sex couples.14
These state-specific policies are largely influenced by competing claims of religious objections, steeped in the constitutional protection of religious freedom, with
the ever-emerging rights15 of same-sex couples. The merits of both claims will not
be undermined here; however, both sides often overlook what should be the focus of
policy objectives—promoting the best interest of children. There is no doubt that
children do best when they are adopted out of the foster care system or are placed

2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, and 14-574) (citing statistics regarding same-sex adoption in support of marriage equality).
8. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 663 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Gary J. Gates, LGBT Parenting in the
United States, THE WILLIAMS INST. 1 (Feb. 2013), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/research/census-lgbtdemographics-studies/lgbt-parenting-in-the-united-states/).
9. What Are the Different Types of Adoption?, ADOPTION.COM (Apr. 14, 2014), http://adoption.com/what-are-the-different-types-of-adoption.
10. See Agency Requirements, AMERICA WORLD ADOPTION ASS’N, http://www.awaa.org/programs/agencyrequirements.aspx., for a list of eligibility requirements requiring, among others, that applicants be at least 25
years old, agree to the AWAA Statement of Faith, and have no less than 2 divorces per spouse. Standards such
as these are present in both public and private placement agencies.
11. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
12. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
13. See Janell Ross, Houston Decided it Had a Problem: Its LGBT Nondiscrimination Law, THE WASH.
POST (Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/11/04/houston-decided-it-had-aproblem-its-lgbt-nondiscrimination-law/ (discussing an attempt to pass, through popular referendum, an antidiscrimination law extending civil rights protection to specified classes, including protection on the basis of
sexual and gender identity).
14. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3 (statute banning adoption by couples of the same gender); Houston
Equal Rights Ordinance, Ord. No. 2014-530 (proposed ordinance banning discrimination on the basis of sexual
and gender identity).
15. “Rights” of same-sex couples as used herein refer to the right not to be discriminated against, to be
treated equally.
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with a committed16 foster family, rather than live in a group home or institution.17
Advocates for same-sex couples seek to advance open access to adoption and
foster care for all couples, usually at the expense of religiously affiliated placement
agencies shutting down rather than sacrifice their religious beliefs preventing them
from placing children with same-sex couples.18 The aftermath following the elimination of these types of placement agencies has been drastic.19 Conversely, advocates
for religious freedom seek to advance religious freedom at the expense of abstaining
from working with same-sex couples, thereby reducing the number of available adoptive and foster care families in which to place children.
This Note will begin with Part I giving the foundational premise that children
thrive in families, followed by Part II giving a general overview of adoption and foster care, including underlying procedural aspects in the United States. Part III will
explore what the “best interest” of children actually entails; revealing present deficiencies as further explained in Part IV. Part IV will examine state policy initiatives
and the legislative means used to advance them. It will present correlating, investigative case studies of various jurisdictions across the United States, exposing the reality and resulting effects of competing interests. Part V will propose alternatives to
the existing deficient statutes.
Specifically, Part V will propose amendments to conscience clauses and religious freedom (RFRA) laws20 protecting the religious freedom, in this case, of religiously affiliated placement agencies. These proposed amendments would include
two provisions. First, it would require placement agencies with religious and moral
objections to disclose the names of other agencies open to placing children with
same-sex couples. Second, it would institute exceptions for situations involving hardto-place children.
Part V will also propose amendments to anti-discrimination statutes, which may
protect same-sex couples from discriminatory actions of religiously affiliated placement agencies. These amendments would include religious exceptions in certain circumstances. Overall, these amendment proposals for various statutory frameworks
will further the best interest of children, which ultimately entails providing every
child with the most stable family situation possible—placement in a home with either
adoptive or committed foster care parents, regardless of sexual orientation.21 In this
way, the rights of children to “grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of
happiness, love, and understanding”22 will be of utmost importance, superior to both
16. The term “committed” will be used throughout this paper to describe parents who understand the difficulties of foster care so that despite the probable, uniquely challenging nature of parenting foster children,
these parents will remain vigilant in their efforts to provide love and care.
17. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 663 (7th Cir. 2014)
18. Maggie Gallagher, Banned in Boston, THE WEEKLY STANDARD (May 15, 2006), http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/191kgwgh.asp?page=3 (reporting on Catholic Charities
of Boston discontinuing its adoption services in wake of Boston’s anti-discrimination statute, which would have
required them to act against their religious beliefs through placement of children with same-sex couples).
19. Id.
20. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1-2 (discussing Michigan’s passage of legislation resembling the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA)); e.g., infra note 90.
21. See Baskin, 766 F.3d at 663.
22. Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption
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religious freedom and the rights of same-sex couples.
I. CHILD’S BEST INTEREST: A FOUNDATIONAL PREMISE
The foundational premise of this paper is that children thrive in loving, caring
families;23 therefore, family placement is in their best interest. In most family law
issues, a child’s best interest is placed at the forefront,24 and that best interest is determined through state-specific statutory determination in each prevailing circumstance.25 These determinations are similar in that none of them give an exact definition of what a child’s “best interest” involves. Instead, they determine that an
evaluation of all relevant factors is necessary.26 When evaluating all relevant factors
for child placement decisions, it is almost always the case that it is in the child’s best
interest to be placed in a family through adoption or with committed foster care parents (as opposed to group homes or institutions) that will provide the love and care
lacking in the biological family from which the child was removed.27
Placement in a family that can provide love and care is firmly in the child’s best
interest, but the notion of a proper “family” is highly contested. Cohabitation, samesex marriage, and other social developments have recently become more commonplace, and advocates exist both for and against the concept of the traditional marital
family challenged by these developments.28
This Note seeks promotion of a child’s best interest regarding placement in a
family through adoption and committed foster care regardless of the common competing interests of religious freedom and the rights of same-sex couples—not what
type of family is in a child’s best interest. While there may be disagreement regarding
the “ideal” family structure for children, whether it be opposite-sex or same-sex parents, there is no doubt that children generally fare better with parents who give them
a secure, loving environment.29 While research proves that marriage most likely
brings that sense of stability, unity, and commitment that mere cohabitating lacks,30
the premise of this Note is that it is in the child’s best interest to be placed in a family

Preamble, Hague Conference on Private International Law, May 29, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-51, 1870
U.N.T.S. 167, available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/conventions/txt33en.pdf.
23. See generally AMERICAN LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.02(1) (discussing the general proposition that children thrive in families); Sandra
Bass et al., Children, Families, and Foster Care: Analysis and Recommendations, 14 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN
5 (2004) (discussing the same general proposition that children thrive in families).
24. The child’s best interest standard is used most frequently in custody and visitation issues. It may also
extend to a broad range of other children’s issues, including adoption and foster care, as emphasized in this
article.
25. IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 357 (2014).
26. Id.
27. See generally Bass et al., supra note 23.
28. See Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for Nonmarital Families, 67 STAN.
L. REV. 167 (2015) (discussing potential legalities surrounding nonmarital families).
29. See Brief for the American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
21, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574) (supporting the principle that children thrive in families).
30. Id.
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which provides a secure, loving environment, regardless of familial structure, because children thrive in families.
II. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Adoption
“[T]he guiding principle of statutes governing the parent-child relationship is the
best interests of the child…”31 In cases where the biological parent and/or birth
mother is unable or unwilling to fulfill the legal parental role, adoption is one mechanism to remedy that situation in working towards the best interest of the child.32
Adoption laws provide a way for an adult lacking a biological link to a child to
legally assume the role of a parent.33 The parent-child relationship created by an
adoption is legally identical to that of biological parents.34 Adoptive children come
from a variety of circumstances, including relinquishment of newborns from unmarried women, children in the child welfare system whose parents’ rights were terminated, and foreign-born children placed in institutions.35 Jurisdiction-specific adoption laws govern the adoption process, along with various restrictions that may be
imposed depending on requests from the biological parents and/or the specific placement agency. Examples of such restrictions include a birth mother’s request that her
child be adopted by parents of a certain ethnicity or a placement agency requiring
adoptive parents to be practicing Christians.36
While adoption laws vary among jurisdiction, the following basic process must
exist for a child to be adopted. First, the child must be “freed” for adoption—the legal
rights of the biological parent(s) are severed (whether voluntarily or involuntarily)
and typically given to an agency.37 Most states have implemented a revocation period
where an expectant mother may revoke her prior relinquishment of parental rights.38
Once that period expires, the agency can then place the child for adoption, and the
birth mother no longer has parental rights.39 The automatic termination of rights protects the adoptive parents from potential claims by the biological parent(s).

31. In re Adoption of K.S.P., 804 N.E.2d 1253, 1257 (Ind. App. 2004) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
32. See infra Part III.A for a detailed explanation of the best interest of children.
33. ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 681.
34. Id.
35. ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 681–84.
36. See Vela v. Marywood, 17 S.W.3d 750, 753 (2000) (discussing the adoption criteria sought by plaintiff
mother, including desire for an open adoption with a Catholic, Mexican-American couple with no other children).
37. ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 681-84.
38. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 690–91 (explaining that states have established different lengths
of time for these revocation periods and giving as examples Georgia, which allows a mother to revoke her
relinquishment of her rights within 10 days of her signature, and Maryland, which allows revocation within 30
days. Overall, revocation periods have typically been shortened over time in order to provide more stability for
the child).
39. Id.
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In the case of adoption by same-sex couples, second parent adoption slowly became the standard across jurisdictions.40 In a second parent adoption, the parental
rights of the birth mother do not automatically terminate when the child is adopted
by her partner. Instead, should both partners in a same-sex relationship agree to be
the legal parents of the child, the court will allow the adoptive parent to waive the
automatic termination of the birthing partner’s parental rights.41 With marriage
equality now extended to same-sex couples from Obergefell, second parent adoption,
however, will be irrelevant since same-sex couples can now marry.
Over time, adoption of children from the welfare system and foreign-born children has increased, with the total number of adopted children in the United States
stabilizing around 127,000.42 While many “ideal” children are easily placed due to
high demand by American parents, hard-to-place children, as the name implies, typically await adoption for long periods of time while living in temporary foster care
arrangements.43 These children are usually older and may have behavior or disability
concerns, and same-sex couples have begun to fill the void in adopting and serving
as long-term foster parents for these particular children.44 In fact, same-sex couples
are four times more likely to adopt and six times more likely to foster children than
opposite-sex couples.45 Since serving the best interest of children is the intent behind
adoption statutes, it is important to ensure that adoption laws are operating accordingly. Unfortunately, incongruence between the intent of adoption laws and their subsequent application prevails.
B. Foster Care
While states always begin with the presumption that children are best off with
their biological parents, evidence demonstrating that the child is not, in fact, best off
with his/her biological parents may overcome the presumption in a state’s decision
to place a child in foster care.46 Foster care is meant to be a temporary arrangement—
when the state places a child in foster care, it is saying that a foster family will provide
a better environment than the child’s biological parent(s) can and will do so until the
parent(s) is ready and able to be reunited with the child.47

40. ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 602.
41. Id.
42. ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 681.
43. See Troy D. Farmer, Note, Protecting the Rights of Hard to Place Children in Adoption, 72 IND. L.J.
1165, 1166 (1997) (discussing the challenge of hard-to-place children).
44. See June Carbone, The Role of Adoption in Winning Public Recognition for Adult Partnerships, 35
CAP. U.L. REV. 341, 394 (2006) (discussing how the fact that same-sex couples tend to adopt and foster hardto-place children more readily than opposite-sex couples is beneficial to securing legal recognition of same-sex
partnerships).
45. Gary J. Gates, The Real ‘Modern Family’ in America, CNN (Mar. 25, 2013),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/24/opinion/gates-real-modern-family (explaining the new reality that many adoptive or foster families include same-sex parents).
46. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (holding that clear and convincing evidence must
be provided to overcome the presumption and that the standard’s requisite burden should be left to state legislatures for precise determination).
47. See Bass et al., supra note 23, at 4–29 (discussing foster care, generally).
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Children enter the foster care system for many different reasons. For those entering at birth, often the newborn’s mother was unable to properly care for the child.
Other children enter after an adult, such as a teacher or neighbor, reports suspicion
of child maltreatment to child protection services and an investigation confirms the
report.48 Foster care can be provided through non-relative families, relatives, group
homes, institutions, or treatment homes.
Once a child is removed from the harmful environment and placed in foster care,
a social worker develops a permanency plan, which is reviewed by the court. Permanency plans outline goals for the child after foster care—typically reunification with
birth parent(s)—based on an assessment of the child’s needs and the familial circumstances.49 If reunification is not possible, other goals may include adoption, care by
relatives, emancipation, guardianship, or long-term foster care.50
The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA)51 legislatively imposed
changes to the foster care system in order to promote adoption and improve the current foster care system. This sweeping federal legislation reduced the time period for
permanent placement decisions, eliminated long-term foster care as a permanent
placement option, and incentivized states to promote adoption first and then foster
care.52 While ASFA imposes much-needed reform to the child welfare system, children are still subject to the highly unstable, inconsistent nature that characterizes foster care.
Instability associated with foster care is detrimental to children’s behavioral
well-being. In a particular study of children in foster care, only half achieved early
stability, while just under twenty percent achieved stability later, and almost thirty
percent never achieved stability.53 Those who achieved early stability had no prior
experience with the child welfare system.54 Notably, early stability is attributed to
better behavioral outcomes over time, but those who achieved stability later or never
at all were more likely to experience behavior problems.55 The inconsistency that
comes with foster care placement only exacerbates a child’s baseline vulnerable condition caused by the maltreatment which put them in foster care in the beginning.56
Therefore, practices that would instill stability and earlier permanence are in the best
interest of children.57 Families willing to foster and ultimately adopt children, especially those who may have unique behavioral or developmental challenges, are necessary.

48. Id. at 6.
49. Id.
50. THE AFCARS REPORT, supra note 1, at 1.
51. The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
52. See id. §§ 673b, 678, 679a, 679b.
53. David M. Rubin et al., The Impact of Placement Stability on Behavioral Well-being for Children in
Foster Care, 119 PEDIATRICS 336 (2007) (discussing how foster care may contribute to instability for a child,
which has negative effects).
54. Id.
55. Rubin et al., supra note 53, at 337.
56. E.g., Bass et al., supra note 23, at 10.
57. E.g., Rubin et al., supra note 53, at 341.
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III. ADVANCING THE BEST INTEREST OF CHILDREN
Literature suggests that should a child’s biological family be incapable of providing a loving, caring, and stable environment, then it is in the child’s best interest to
be placed with adoptive parents followed by placement with committed foster parents.58
A. A Child’s Best Interest, Devoid of Competing Agendas
Adoption and foster care are the very best solutions for a child lacking a family.59
Without a family, children are at risk for remaining in the foster care system indefinitely, which has devastating consequences.60 In terms of education, outcomes for
children in long-term foster care are dismal. Many missed school days from moving
homes, uncertainty and discomfort that comes with moving schools, and missing academic records and gaps in teaching all amount to low educational results.61 In terms
of the transition from childhood to adulthood, foster children aging out of the system
have little support, which may lead to future criminal activity and unproductive behavior.62 Adoption and committed foster parents can change this negative outlook.
In advancing the best interest of children, promotion of adoption and foster care
by committed parents should take precedent when competing with other interests,
such as those commonly involving religious freedom and the rights of same-sex couples. In Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, the Court identified the competing interests of the child and her father, the Petitioner, and ultimately held for the
child.63 The Court based its reasoning partially on the fact that it was in the child’s
best interest not to be the center of a public controversy, prevailing over her father’s
wishes to restrict the school district from forcing her to say the pledge, which compromised his atheistic beliefs.64 “Newdow’s rights, as in many cases touching upon
family relations, cannot be viewed in isolation… most importantly, it implicates the
interests of a young child who finds herself at the center of a highly public debate
involving her custody.”65 The Court recognized that while a father may have a liberty
interest in teaching his child according to his atheistic beliefs, this interest exists concurrently with the child’s. In balancing these interests, the child’s best interest prevails.66
Elk Grove does not implicate insignificance for interests competing with a child.
Nor does it preclude advocating for those competing interests. Instead, it necessarily
58. See Bass et al., supra note 23 and accompanying text.
59. Id.; see generally supra Part I (discussing the foundational premise that children thrive in families).
60. See Delilah Bruskas, Children in Foster Care: A Vulnerable Population at Risk, 21 J. OF CHILD AND
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC NURSING 70 (2008).
61. Id. at 71.
62. Id.
63. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2014).
64. Id.
65. Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 15 (emphasis added).
66. The Supreme Court also uphold children’s interests in the following contexts: abortion rights in Belotti
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); free speech in Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969); and religious rights in W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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shifts the child’s best interest to the forefront. This is vital because children are the
future, and adoption and committed foster care gives them the best chance at achieving well-being and becoming productive citizens.67 In situations involving competing
interests of religious freedom and the rights of same-sex couples, these interests cannot be viewed in isolation. It is not simply a question of preservation of religious
freedom, nor is it simply a question of advancing the rights of same-sex couples. The
child’s interest in being adopted or placed with committed foster parents must be
considered first and foremost, which best ensures the opportunity for well-being and
development.68
B. Competing Perspectives and Their Current Deficiencies
To effectuate the best interest of children, parties involved in the placement process for children with adoptive and committed foster families—including the government, private and public agencies, same-sex and opposite-sex couples, and others—must work together toward that goal. In practice, however, proponents of
competing interests often interfere, whether implicitly or explicitly, with the best interests of children in placement with adoptive and committed foster parents. In pursuit of furthering their own objectives, consideration of a child’s best interest may be
lost.
Debate involving true concern for the best interest of children is rare. Commonly
entangled with religious freedom arguments, advocacy for marriage equality, support
for the “optimal” family, problems resulting from government’s limited financial resources, and public interest concerns, a child’s best interest may easily be lost
amongst the competing groups pushing to advance one issue or another. Children are
unable to advocate for themselves, and the unfortunate, unintended consequence of
the passionate, well-intentioned efforts of these groups is that a child’s best interests
may be pushed to the background.
Adults have oftentimes failed to fill that void absent conflation with various other
issues.69 Presently in adoption and foster care, two interest groups substantially compete, and thus inherently subsume, what should be the superior, primary concern for
a child’s best interests. These groups are: (1) religious objectors affiliated with private placement agencies, and (2) proponents of rights for same-sex couples. Both
groups are deficient in adequately protecting a child’s best interest.
1. Religious Objectors
Religious objectors fight for the rights of those agencies who, according to their
religious convictions, wish to withhold child placement from certain potential adoptive parents—typically, same-sex couples. Claiming to uphold and protect the right
to religious freedom, this group does so at the cost of either decreasing the pool of
67. See Bass et al., supra note 23 (discussing the significant connection between foster care and adoption
and children’s wellbeing).
68. Id.
69. See generally Gallagher, supra note 18 (providing an example in which advocates for anti-discrimination legislation failed to consider the interests of children).
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potential adoptive parents or losing the chance to place children at all, should the
state consequently refuse to grant them operating licenses.
While advocating for religiously affiliated agencies to stay open and place children with families fulfilling certain requirements, usually heterosexual marriage,
same-sex couples may be deterred from adoption if a private agency refuses to work
with them. Reducing placement options according to a couple’s sexual orientation is
not in the best interest of children.70 Not only does simply decreasing the number of
potential adoptive parents bode negatively for children’s chances for family placement, but it also contributes to the often tragic outcome for those hard-to-place children (children with special needs, older children, and homosexual children) whom
same-sex couples are more likely to adopt.71 Children lacking placement often end
up in group homes, various foster care homes, and institutions—options that are more
detrimental to a child’s development than adoption or committed foster care.72 Conscience clauses and RFRA statutes contribute to, and may even result in, those negative consequences.
In an alternative scenario, a religiously affiliated agency could refuse to place
children with same-sex couples, thereby losing its license for violating anti-discrimination statutes. These agencies would forfeit the opportunity to place children overall—even non-controversial placements with opposite-sex parents.
2. Proponents for Same-Sex Couples
Proponents for same-sex couples’ rights to adopt and foster children do so with
good intentions. Anti-discrimination statutes are typically used to protect these rights,
but they do so at the cost of terminating placement services of private agencies with
religious objections.73 Preventing discrimination has several positive outcomes:
same-sex couples can enjoy the freedom to adopt and foster children as opposite-sex
couples enjoy, and children are more likely to be placed if there are more interested
adoptive couples, especially since same-sex couples are four and a half times more
likely to adopt and foster children and hard-to-place children than opposite-sex couples.74
In theory, anti-discrimination statutes seem reasonable—mandating equal treatment while at the same time increasing children’s potential for adoption and foster
care placement.75 In practice, however, these statutes have concurrently caused harm
for children, when religiously affiliated placement agencies close rather than sacrifice
their religious convictions to comply with anti-discrimination statutes.76 Whether or
70. Brief for the Donaldson Adoption Institute et al. as Amici Curiae, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
2584 (2014) (arguing that children thrive in families; therefore, a same-sex couple seeking to adopt or foster
children should not be prevented from doing so).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Abbie E. Goldberg et al., Research Report on LGB Parent-Families, THE WILLIAMS INST. (July 2014),
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/lgb-parent-families-execsum-july-2014.pdf (explaining results from a study on LGB parent-families).
75. See Brief for the Donaldson Adoption Institute et al., supra note 70.
76. See Gallagher, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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not one believes in the rationale behind this decision, it can be agreed upon that without the adoption services of Catholic Charities, children have fewer advocates.77
Proponents of anti-discrimination statutes seek tolerance for their belief in equal
treatment of same-sex couples, but at the expense of intolerance for the beliefs of
religiously affiliated agencies who would sooner close their doors than act contrary
to their religious convictions.78 This essentially trades the best interest of children—
adoption placement or foster care, regardless of beliefs surrounding homosexual behavior—for the best interest of same-sex couples in equal treatment.
While many issues are certainly worthy of recognition and advocacy, they do so
at the cost of the children’s best interest. Both sides fail to embrace the best interest
of children, resulting in couples without children, closed private agencies, frustrated
parties… but most importantly, children without families.
IV. CURRENT STATUTORY FRAMEWORKS AND CORRESPONDING CASE STUDIES
Laws governing adoption and foster care exist at the federal, state, and local
levels. These laws are facially purposed to promote the best interest of children, but
with states as “laboratories for democracy,”79 each has unique ways of accomplishing
that task. Justice Brandeis explained that these state-specific experiments were of no
risk to the rest of the country,80 but in the case of children placed in the foster care
system or awaiting adoption, these laws are burdened with an increased impact—an
impact with the potential to change the life of a child forever.
With this in mind, states legislatively determine methods to promote the best
interests of its children. The following mechanisms are among those commonly employed.
A. Conscience Clauses
1. Overview
Generally, a conscience clause is “a clause in an act or law providing exemptions on the grounds of conscience or belief.”81 Also termed “refusal clauses,” their
use began within the medical profession for those who refused to perform services
legalized by the Roe v. Wade82 decision which interfered with their religious and
moral beliefs.83 Over time, conscience clauses have been used to protect the consciences of those within institutions, medical fields, and related situations which
could otherwise require one to act in opposition to his or her religious convictions.

77. Id.
78. E.g., Gallagher, supra note 18.
79. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
80. Id.
81. Conscience Clause, THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/39460?redirectedFrom=conscience+clause#eid8572513.
82. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
83. Tom C.W. Lin, Treating an Unhealthy Conscience: A Prescription for Medical Conscience Clauses,
31 VT. L. REV. 105 (2006) (discussing the history of conscience clauses within the healthcare context).
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In the context of adoption and foster care, a conscience clause enables placement
agencies to act upon their religious beliefs in child placement. For example, an
agency may require adoptive parents or be of a specific religion or identify with a
certain sexual orientation. This is permissible because placement agencies may act in
accordance with their conscience without fear of government interference. Since
many placement agencies are religiously affiliated and thus religiously motivated,
allowing them to operate according to their conscience, as provided by conscience
clauses, increases the number of agencies working to place children.
2. Virginia Case Study
While the federal government has enacted conscience clauses, states have also
widely adopted this measure. In April 2012, Virginia Governor Robert McDonnell
signed into law Virginia House Bill 189 amending the Code of Virginia.84 This addition notably includes a conscience clause relating to private child placement agencies, which, as generally stated in the previous section, allows placement agencies to
refuse to “perform, assist, counsel, recommend, consent to, refer, or participate” in
any child placement with an adoptive or foster care family that violates an agency’s
religious convictions.85 The law also protects these agencies from possible adverse
state action and lawsuits in response to their religiously or morally influenced actions.86
The conscience clause addition effectively protects the rights of 77 private agencies (as opposed to the state’s 120 public social services departments) located
throughout the state to refuse placement on the basis of religious convictions. These
agencies were responsible for placing 557 children of the 2,503 total placements in
2011.87 Yet, with protection of these agencies’ rights comes the potential for refusing
placement in same-sex couples’ homes, and fewer options for placement may lead to
the negative outcome of alternative placement in group homes or institutions. This is
not in the best interest of children since children do better with adoptive or committed
foster care parents than in group homes or institutions.88
B. Religious Freedom Restoration Acts
1. Overview
The federal government first enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of

84. VA H.B. 189.
85. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1709.3
86. Id.
87. E.g., Anita Kumar, Virginia Adding “Conscience Clause” to Adoption Laws, THE WASHINGTON POST
(Feb. 7, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/virginia-adding-conscience-clause-to-adoption-laws/2012/02/03/gIQAUJ6gxQ_story.html.
88. See Letter from Gary J. Gates, PhD, Williams Distinguished Scholar, Williams Inst., UCLA Law
School to A. Donald McEachin, Senator, 9th District, Commonwealth of Virginia (Feb. 6, 2012) (on file with
the Williams Inst.) (expressing opposition to Virginia’s conscience clause legislation because it would allow
placement agencies to refuse child placement with same-sex couples, decreasing the chance of child placement
in a family).
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1993 (RFRA)89 under President Bill Clinton. President Clinton explained the law as
one which legislatively enacted the requirement for a high level of proof before the
federal government could interfere with one’s free exercise of religion.90 The purposes of the law, as given in the text, include reestablishment of the compelling interest test set forth in Wisconsin v. Yoder91 and Sherbert v. Warner92 and provision
of a defense to those whose religious freedom was substantially burdened by the government.93
The reinstated compelling interest test provides that government may only burden the exercise of religion if that burden is in furtherance of a compelling government interest which is narrowly tailored to be the least restrictive means in furthering
that interest.94 After the federal government enacted RFRA, states followed suit in
enacting their own versions of RFRA legislation to protect their citizens against state
infringement of religious freedom.95 Several of these RFRA laws have been challenged as allowing and furthering discrimination, which is also constitutionally protected against under the Fourteenth Amendment.
RFRA laws may be used to protect the religiously motivated actions of placement agencies. Requiring the government to present compelling justification against
religiously affiliated actions of placement agencies prevents an arbitrary government
decision which may infringe on religious freedom. Meeting the standard of compelling justification imposes a challenging obstacle on government decisions because
few interests exist which are so compelling as to overcome the interest of allowing
agencies to place children in families. This allows placement agencies to continue
their work placing children in families.
2. Michigan Case Study
In June 2015, Michigan Governor Rick Snyder signed into law Michigan House
Bill 4188, a religious freedom adoption law.96 The law emulates the federal RFRA
statute, as discussed generally in the previous section. It protects the religious freedom of placement agencies as given by the United States Constitution, which recognizes religious freedom as an inherent, fundamental, and unalienable right.97 The relevant implication of Michigan’s statute to child placement agencies is that the state
89. 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000bb (2016).
90. Bill Clinton, Remember When Democrats Used to Support Religious Freedom? Remarks on Signing
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, THE FEDERALIST (March 26, 2015), http://thefederalist.com/2015/03/26/remember-when-democrats-used-to-support-religious-freedom/ (containing a transcript of
then-President Clinton’s speech at the signing ceremony for the federal RFRA in 1993).
91. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1971).
92. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
93. See Wisconsin, 406 U.S. 205.
94. Id.
95. Currently, 20 states have RFRA statutes—Connecticut, Rhode Island, Florida, Illinois, Alabama, Arizona, South Carolina, Texas, Idaho, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Missouri, Virginia, Tennessee,
Louisiana, Kentucky, Kansas, Mississippi, and Indiana.
96. David Eggert, New Michigan Law Lets Adoption Agencies Decline Referrals, VALLEY CENTRAL (Jun.
12, 2015, 12:15 AM), http://valleycentral.com/news/politics/new-michigan-law-lets-adoption-agencies-decline-referrals-08-25-2015?id=1216742 (reporting on Michigan’s passage of a religious freedom adoption law).
97. 2015 MI H.B. 4188, codified at M.C.L. 722.111-722.128, 14(e)-(f)
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government cannot substantially burden their right to free exercise of religion—denying placement on the basis of religious objections, usually in situations involving
same-sex couples. Legislation similar to Virginia’s conscience clause is pending in
the Michigan state legislature, as well.
Two private, faith-based agencies together facilitate 25-30% of Michigan’s foster care adoptions, and they were a powerful force behind the enactment of the new
law.98 Like Virginia’s governor, Governor Snyder and supporting groups claim to be
acting in the best interest of children by protecting private agencies so that the highest
number of children may be placed in families. Conversely, opponents such as the
ACLU of Michigan claim that agencies receiving state funding, which include the
private agencies invoking protection under the new religious freedom adoption law,
are therefore obligated to act in the best interest of children, which means placement
in a family regardless of the sexual orientation of the adoptive parents.99
C. Adoption Bans
1. Overview
Adoption bans legislatively prohibit adoption in certain circumstances, whether
that be adoption by unmarried couples, same-sex couples, etc. This measure is uncommon due to its broad, typically over-inclusive reach, but it still exists in some
states. The Arkansas Supreme Court recently struck down its state-wide adoption ban
because it was a discriminatory barrier that infringed on the privacy of individuals.100
Similarly, Florida’s Governor Rick Scott recently signed a bill repealing adoption
bans for same-sex couples.101
Those who believe children do best with opposite-sex parents praise adoption
bans as promoting the best interest of children, but since it is in the best interest for
children to be adopted or place with committed foster parents, is this type of law truly
advancing their best interest?
2. Mississippi Case Study
In 2000, then-Governor Ronnie Musgrove of Mississippi signed a bill which
entirely banned same-gender adoptions.102 Same-sex couples have evaded the law by
having only one parent legally adopt the child, but then the other parent is legally a
complete stranger to the child.103 This is alarming since same-sex couples in Mississippi comprise the largest percentage, 29% as of 2014, of same-sex couples in the
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Cole, 380 S.W.3d 429 (Ark. 2011).
101. See generally Michael K. Lavers, Florida Gay Adoption Ban Repealed, WASH. BLADE (June 12,
2015), http://www.washingtonblade.com/2015/06/12/florida-gay-adoption-ban-repealed/ (reporting on Florida’s passage of a law overturning the ban on same-sex adoption).
102. See MISS. CODE ANN., supra note 14.
103. Tamar Lewin, Mississippi Ban on Adoptions by Same-Sex Couples is Challenged, THE NEW YORK
TIMES (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/13/us/mississippi-ban-on-adoptions-same-sex-couples-challenged.html?_r=0 (explaining how same-sex couples in Mississippi have circumvented the law in order
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nation who are raising children under 18.104 While lawsuits challenging the ban are
pending,105 the Obergefell106 decision recognizing the right to same-sex marriage enables a claim for a right to same-sex adoption indistinguishable. In addition, the trajectory in both Arkansas and Florida is predictive of what will likely unfold in Mississippi.
Governor Musgrove later wrote an opinion piece expressing regret for passing
the law.107 He explained his realization that a child’s best interests should be of utmost importance, rather than religious objections or deep-rooted prejudice.108
States believing that children do best with opposite-sex parents believe adoption
bans will promote the best interest of children; however, that proposition has been
debunked in recent studies.109 There is no evidence that children of same-sex parents
have stifled educational or academic outcomes, and children of same-sex parents
demonstrate little difference compared to children of opposite-sex parents in terms
of social functioning, including self-esteem and psychological adjustment.110 Since
children of same-sex parents have been found to be well-adjusted compared to their
counterparts, adoption bans purporting to promote the best interest of children are
misguided—preventing children from being adopted by same-sex parents is not in
their best interest. Children need parents to facilitate their development, and both
same-sex and opposite parents are fully capable of that task.111
D. Anti-Discrimination Laws
1. Overview
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal treatment under the law
prompted Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act,112 prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of race. Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation was
addressed by the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas.113 The anti-sodomy law was
struck down, and the Court opined that such a law was an “invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination.”114 There is no federal statute, however, prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation because sexual orientation is
not considered a protected class.

to adopt and foster children).
104. Id.
105. See e.g. Campaign for Southern Equality v. Miss. Dep’t of Human Services, No. 3517:cv 578DPJFKB (S.D. Miss. filed Aug. 12, 2015).
106. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584.
107. Ronnie Musgrove, Portman’s Conversion Should Be a Lesson, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 20,
2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ronnie-musgrove/portmans-conversion-shoul_b_2918493.html.
108. Id.
109. Goldberg et al., supra note 74 (citing studies which reject the commonly-held belief that children do
best with opposite-sex couples).
110. Id. at 3.
111. Goldberg et al., supra note 74, at 15-25 (discussing the wellbeing of children in same-sex homes).
112. 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e (2016)
113. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
114. Id. at 575.
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To address this void, some states have expanded their anti-discrimination laws
to include a prohibition on sexual orientation discrimination, which may reach beyond the usual context of employment.115 State laws may provide insulation from
sexual orientation discrimination within employment, housing, credit, services, or
places of public accommodation.116
Twenty states117 currently have statutes prohibiting discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation, ranging from prohibition in very limited contexts, such as with
government contractors, to general bans outright.118 These laws purport to advance
equality by prohibiting unequal treatment of individuals based on their sexual orientation, but they may also conflict with other established rights and freedoms, forcing
difficult policy decisions.
2. Boston Case Study
In 1989, Massachusetts became the second state to pass an anti-discrimination
law for sexual orientation.119 In the absence of a RFRA-like statute like that in Michigan or conscience clauses relevant to child placement agencies like that in Virginia,
Massachusetts is essentially devoid of protection for religious freedom for child
placement agencies with religious or moral objections to certain placements.
This resulted in Catholic Charities of Boston ending its adoption services in
2006. The private agency had religious objections to placing children with same-sex
couples, and Catholic teaching would not overlook religious restrictions in order to
continue operation. In Massachusetts, adoption agencies must be licensed by the
state. So when the state refused to issue licenses to agencies like Catholic Charities
for defying the anti-discrimination statutes,120 those agencies ceased their adoption
services.121 The best interest of Boston’s children entails placement in a family, not
the closing of Catholic Charities’ adoption services so that same-sex couples escape
discrimination.

115. See Joel M. Nolan, Comment, Chipping Away at the Iceberg: How Massachusetts Anti-Discrimination
Law Can Survive ERISA Preemption and Mandate the Extension of Employee Benefits to All Married Spouses
Without Regard to Sexual Orientation, 42 NEW ENG. L. REV. 109, 110 (2007) (discussing the context of the
state of Massachusetts).
116. See Anti-Discrimination Law in Massachusetts, GAY & LESBIAN ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS,
https://www.glad.org/rights/massachusetts/c/anti-discrimination-law-in-massachusetts (last updated Feb.
2014).
117. Twenty states have statutes preventing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation: California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. See THE BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, ISSUES BRIEF: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND STATE ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS 3 (2009).
118. Id.
119. See Gallagher, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
120. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 151B §4 (West 2004); see also Gallagher, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
121. See Gallagher, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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E. Executive Order
1. Overview
An executive order enables an executive, such as the President or a state governor, to circumvent the normal legislative process in making decisions which implicate the executive’s enumerated powers.122 In the case of the Presidency, administrative functions, certain war-time directives, execution of foreign policy, and federal
law enforcement all fall within those enumerated powers.123 Likewise, state governors are given certain enumerated powers in his/her respective state constitution,
from which they may accordingly issue executive orders.
The constitutional mandate for a separation of powers gives rise to the validity
of the executive order, but despite this fact, its usage has been controversial since the
founding of the United States.124 While Congress can challenge an order, it rarely
does so since the executive authority to issue such orders has been broadly interpreted
so as to limit Congress’s interference with the functioning of the executive branch.125
It is uncommon for an executive order to be used in family law matters like adoption or foster care; however, in terms of public policy, executive orders are very effective in clearly and directly furthering policy initiatives.
2. Arizona Case Study
In Arizona, Governor Douglas Ducey issued an executive order permitting samesex married couples to adopt and foster children.126 This order followed reports that
the Arizona Department of Child Safety (DCS), upon the legal advice of Attorney
General Brnovich, was refusing to place children with same-sex married adoptive
parents until the Supreme Court issued a decision on same-sex marriage. Nevertheless, Governor Ducey did not waiver in his support for adoption, which stems from
his own adoption experience as a child, and instead reversed the DCS policy in direct
opposition to Attorney General Brnovich’s legal advice.
The underlying objective of Governor Ducey’s executive order was to promote
the best interest of children—placing them with loving families.127 This order is one
of the few that achieves its stated purpose of advancing children’s best interests. It
was directed at a government agency, the DCS, and so it did not impinge on any
religious objections that may exist with private placement agencies which could
cause them to shut down. The order for the DCS to continue adoption placements for
122. See generally Todd F. Gaziano, The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders and Other Presidential Directives, 5 TEX. REV. LAW & POL. 267, 278-79 (2001) (explaining the history and use of executive orders).
123. Id. at 276-78.
124. See Gaziano, supra note 122, at 282.
125. Id.; see generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (explaining the appropriate circumstances for use of an executive order).
126. See Alia Beard Rau & Yvonne Wingett Sanchez, Ducey: Arizona Gay Couples Can Again Adopt,
Foster Together, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/04/23/ariz-same-sex-couples-adoption-foster/26228671/ (reporting on an executive order in Arizona
overturning the ban on same-sex adoption).
127. Id.
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same-sex married couples also demonstrates the underlying commitment to the best
interest of children,128 since it is undisputed that children’s wellbeing positively correlates with the stability that married parents often provide.129
V. AMENDMENT PROPOSALS TO EXISTING STATUTORY FRAMEWORKS
Overall, both proponents for religious freedom and proponents for same-sex couples’ rights can approach their advocacy efforts in a way that would consider and thus
protect the best interest of children, first and foremost. State legislatures can implement reform that statutorily protects the best interest of children. Reform is necessary
on both sides of the debate—for those measures placing religious liberty at the forefront and, conversely, for those measures placing rights of equality for same-sex couples at the forefront.
A. Amendments to Conscience Clauses and RFRA Statutes
For those states that currently have conscience clauses or RFRA statutes protecting religious liberty, the problem lies therein with the potential for religious placement agencies to turn away prospective same-sex parents, decreasing the chances for
children to get placed. In order to both protect religious freedom and advance the best
interests of children, states should pass an amendment to these statutes, if they do not
already contain such an amendment, requiring placement agencies to act in the best
interest of children.130 This involves adherence to the following proposals.
1. Disclosure Requirement
A disclosure requirement would mandate that placement agencies, should they
refuse placement to prospective parents on grounds of sincere religious objection,
provide a list of reasonable alternative agencies which would be willing to work with
the couple. This disclosure requirement serves a two-fold purpose. First, it facilitates
the process for same-sex couples to continue working towards adoption or foster care.
Second, agencies willing to work with same-sex couples will be able to place more
children in loving families.
Professor Wilson implies this type of disclosure requirement when she likened
the same-sex adoption controversy with the abortion debate following Roe,131 where
healthcare providers with religious objections to providing abortion services were

128. See generally Huntington, supra note 28; see supra Part III.A.
129. See generally ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 549 (explaining how marriage promotes stability and
well-being for children).
130. See supra Part I and II (discussing the standard for a child’s best interest as deriving from numerous
studies and research, which defines it as placement in a family, regardless of the sexual orientation of the parents).
131. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Mark Strasser, Conscience Clauses and the Placement of Children,
13 UTAH L. REV. 985, 993 (2013) (referring to Robin Fretwell Wilson, A Matter of Conviction: Moral Clashes
over Same-Sex Adoption, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 475, 492 (2008)).
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permitted to decline if they provided a referral to one who would provide the service.132 Required disclosure in the realm of placement agencies would accomplish
the same objective—allowing religious objectors to practice their sincerely held beliefs without completely barring same-sex couples from adoption and foster care.133
Michigan’s new religious freedom adoption law discussed supra134 includes a
similar type of disclosure requirement, which provides that an agency declining to
place a child for religious reasons must (1) refer the applicant(s) to an agency willing
to provide placement services, and (2) refer the applicant to the state department’s
website listing alternative child placement agencies.135 Disclosure requirements
modeling those in Michigan would be extremely effective in ensuring that families
who seek to adopt or foster children are able to do so, thus increasing a child’s chance
for placement in a family.
2. Exceptions
The amendment would also include two provisions resulting in possible exceptions to the disclosure requirement previously discussed. The first exception is for
hard-to-place children. Since those children are already less likely to be placed regardless of restrictions an agency may impose,136 special consideration should be
given.137 While agencies have much discretion in the placement process, the amendment would encourage additional steps be taken in ensuring the placement of hardto-place children. Other steps may include more detailed disclosure of alternative
agencies to same-sex couples looking to adopt a hard-to-place child, or disclosure to
a birth mother of a hard-to-place child that a non-religious agency may be a better
choice in finding a forever home for her child.
Second, there should be a provision for children who demonstrate maturity and
sincere understanding regarding their own religious beliefs, which may not preclude
their placement with a same-sex couple.138 While the agency may disagree according
to its own religious convictions to placement with a same-sex couple, a child who is
of a mature age, demonstrates true understanding of the situation and his or her own
religious beliefs, and does not object to placement with a same-sex couple should be
transferred to an agency without religiously-imposed limitations on placement.139
This would likely be a rarely granted exception, but is, nevertheless, worth mentioning in order to best facilitate a child’s best interest and family placement.
132. See Wilson, supra note 131, at 478-482 (comparing religious objection of provision of abortion services to religious objection of child placement with same-sex couples).
133. Id. at 494.
134. See supra Part IV.B.2.
135. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §722.124e, Sec. 14(e)(4)(a)-(b) (West 2015).
136. See Gates, supra note 45, at 1166.
137. See Wilson, supra note 131, at 495 (suggesting deep consideration be given regarding the impact of
any proposed state action on the hardest-to-place children).
138. The reasoning for this provision is based on the reasoning given in Justice Douglas’ dissent in Yoder,
which is discussed in-depth infra Part V.B.1. His dissent encourages protection of a mature child’s religious
belief, which also encompasses the absence of religious belief. See infra Part V.B.1 and Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
139. See infra Part V.B.1.
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3. Addressing Counterarguments
While religiously affiliated agencies may have concerns with seemingly facilitating the process for same-sex couples to become parents, merely informing prospective same-sex parents of other agencies that would serve them strikes a reasonable balance in advancing the best interest of children and protecting religious
freedom. Religiously affiliated agencies should be given discretion in choosing how
informative to be—ranging from simply giving the couple a list of alternative agencies to full counseling on how best to proceed.
Likewise, same-sex couples and their advocates may have concerns that conscience clauses and RFRA-type laws perpetuate discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. Limiting protection only for those sincerely-held religious objections,
and not simply moral objections, may curb some of this concern. The majority opinion in Yoder granted an exception to the Old Order Amish concerning compulsory
attendance in school until age 16.140 This exception was granted after an abundance
of evidence was shown which demonstrated and explained Amish beliefs (and the
sources of those beliefs) precluding school attendance after the eighth grade.141 The
record also demonstrated a profound negative impact on the community of Old Order
Amish—probable extinction—should Amish children be required to comply with
Wisconsin’s compulsory school attendance law.142 Profound negative impact has already been seen in the closing of Catholic Charities’ adoption services in Boston.143
This response could potentially be elicited in any state which enacts anti-discrimination legislation like that to which Catholic Charities of Boston was subjected. Requiring a certain high threshold of evidence proving legitimacy of religious objection,
like the majority in Yoder required, will limit arbitrary objections claiming a religiously based objection.
In summary, an amendment to conscience clause and RFRA statutes should include (1) required disclosure to same-sex couples of agencies that will work with
them, and (2) provisions requiring: (a) more informative disclosure to same-sex couples and birth parents when hard-to-place children are involved, and (b) the option
for a child who does not share a religiously affiliated agency’s objection to placement
with a same-sex couple to be transferred to an agency that is open to such placement.
This allows religiously affiliated placement agencies to continue placing children according to their religious convictions, while also preserving the opportunity for samesex couples to adopt. It also encourages best practices for hard-to-place children and
mature children who do not have religious objections to placement with a same-sex
couple, resulting in an increased likelihood for placement.
B. Amendments to Anti-Discrimination Laws
For states with laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,
140. See Yoder, 406 U.S. 205.
141. Id. at 217.
142. See Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 at 218.
143. See generally Gallagher, supra note 18 (providing an example in which advocates for anti-discrimination legislation failed to consider the interests of children).
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the problem lies therein with refusal to grant operating licenses to agencies which
violate those statutes. Intolerance for religiously affiliated placement agencies, to the
extent that they must close down for lack of a license, lessens the likelihood for children to be placed since one less agency will be working on their behalf. In order to
both further the best interest of children while protecting same-sex couples from discrimination, states should pass an amendment to these statutes which allows for religious exceptions in certain circumstances and provides for their continued tax-exempt status.
1. Religious Exemptions
Religious exemptions should be given in certain circumstances—one being for
religiously affiliated agencies that were in operation before the anti-discrimination
law was passed. That exemption would include, however, the preservation of the provisions given in the previous section—disclosure of alternative agencies to same-sex
couples and disclosure to birth parents of hard-to-place children of the agency’s religious beliefs and the resulting probable consequences.144
A second circumstance justifying an exemption exists when the child’s best interest requires placement with opposite-sex parents. This determination, similar to
that supra Part V.A.2, may be made either by an older child who has sincere religious
convictions or by the state through its social workers and guardian ad litems. In
Yoder,145 the Court dealt with a conflict between a couple’s Amish faith forbidding
education past the eighth grade and a state law requiring education up to age sixteen.146 While the Court ultimately held for the parental autonomy of the Amish couple, Justice Douglas’ well-known dissent suggested that older children have a legally
protected interest regarding their own welfare that may be in opposition to that of
their parents.147 This interest would then demand a hearing before a State took action
on their behalf.
Justice Douglas’ dissent, while not controlling, should be readily considered in
its application to the adoption and foster care context where a child in middle or high
school may have formed sincere religious beliefs opposed to placement with a samesex couple. In this type of circumstance, those beliefs should be honored. “Where the
child is mature enough to express potentially conflicting desires, it would be an invasion of the child’s rights to permit such an imposition… Religion is an individual
experience.”148 Justice Douglas posited that a mature child’s religious freedom was
subject to constitutional protection, and religious exemptions to anti-discrimination
statutes would accomplish that prerogative. This exemption, however would still be
subject to a high threshold of evidence proving the religious belief to be sincerely
held, as discussed supra.149

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

See supra Part V.A.1.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205.
Id.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 at 242-43.
Id.
See discussion supra Part V.A.3.
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2. Tax-Exempt Status
Notwithstanding anti-discrimination statutes, states should continue to grant taxexempt status to charitable organizations utilizing the religious exemption in jurisdictions with anti-discrimination statutes, as explained in the previous section. Without these exemptions, most of those organizations would be unable to remain open,
and their closure would negatively affect the best interest of children. Following the
Church Amendment model,150 which allowed religiously affiliated hospitals receiving federal funding to refrain from performing abortions after Roe,151 the state should
preserve religiously affiliated placement agencies’ tax-exempt status regardless of
religiously motivated restrictions that may violate the anti-discrimination statutes in
place.
Tax-exempt status is governed by Section 501(c)(3),152 which has been held to
apply to those charitable organizations that serve a public purpose and do not conflict
with public policy.153 As explained by the Court, “Congress sought to provide tax
benefits to charitable organizations, to encourage the development of private institutions that serve a useful public purpose or supplement or take the place of public
institutions of the same kind.”154
In Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, the racial discrimination practiced in the
admissions process at Bob Jones was affirmed as failing to serve a public purpose
and as contrary to public policy.155 Therefore, it was not awarded tax exemption under Section 501(c)(3).156 In contrast, however, religiously affiliated child placement
agencies do serve several public purposes. First and most importantly, these agencies
facilitate placement of children with families to advance their best interest. Second,
placing children in families may reduce the financial expense for the state. The foster
care system in Virginia, for example, spends thirty-thousand dollars per foster child
and an extra two thousand dollars per foster child in state-run group homes each
year.157 Therefore, adoption out of the system would save a considerable amount of
money for the state.158 Lastly, this does not conflict with public policy purporting to
advance equality through anti-discrimination statues, so long as those agencies adhere to the proposed disclosure requirements facilitating adoption or foster care

150. ROBIN FRETWELL WILSON, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage from the
Healthcare Context, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 77, 79 (Douglas
Laycock et al. eds., 2008) (explaining the Church Amendment model in the healthcare context which allowed
healthcare providers to act upon their religious beliefs by refusing to provide abortion services, while continuing
to receive federal funding).
151. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
152. I.R.C. §501(c)(3)
153. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983) (holding that racial discrimination in
admissions process practiced by Bob Jones University did not serve a public purpose and conflicted with the
public policy’s objective to abolish racial discrimination).
154. Id. at 588.
155. Id.
156. I.R.C. §501(c)(3)
157. See Clinton, supra note 90 and accompanying text.
158. Id.
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placement with same-sex couples.159
3. Addressing Counterarguments
Proponents of anti-discrimination statutes may disagree with the preservation of
tax-exempt status for religiously affiliated placement agencies on the grounds that
those agencies are practicing discrimination and thus do not fulfill the statutory requirement of a “useful public purpose” necessary to receive a tax exemption.160 Who
decides what a “useful public purpose” may be? This question correlates with the
broader question asked by many constitutional theorists—who is ultimately responsible for statutory interpretation and how should statutes by interpreted?161 These
issues are outside the bounds of this paper, but this proposition must be given serious
consideration, given its immense significance on all areas of law.
While proponents of anti-discrimination statutes may disagree with certain exemptions for religiously affiliated agencies on the grounds that the exemptions undermine the fundamental purpose of the law itself (that purpose being to eliminate
discrimination), the best interest of children should be advanced first and foremost.
This may be a subjective policy-driven decision, but the disclosure requirements for
religiously affiliated agencies, discussed supra Part V.A.1, prevent the occurrence of
gross discrimination, allow same-sex couples to be referred to an agency which will
assist them, and protect the religious liberty of placement agencies holding sincere
religious beliefs preventing them from placing children with same-sex couples. Religious exemptions have been upheld in many contexts, most notably healthcare,162
where secular legislation burdens religious exercise. Prioritizing a religious exemption in a situation where a religious placement agency was in operation before an
anti-discrimination statute was enacted will allow those agencies to remain open,
which advances the child’s best interest in family placement above all else.
Religiously affiliated agencies would still be prevented from acting upon their
convictions should they open a new operation in a jurisdiction with an anti-discrimination statute already in place. This would likely effect a negative outlook for children because religious agencies would be less willing to open and operate where they
may not act according to their religious beliefs, but this is also a policy consideration
that a state must understand and prepare to accept when they establish an anti-discrimination statute.
Both circumstances justifying religious exemptions and the preservation of taxexempt status would ensure advancement of a child’s best interest, while concurrently upholding religious freedom and respecting anti-discrimination statutes.

159. See discussion supra Part V.A.
160. I.R.C. §501(c)(3)
161. See generally MICHAEL J. GERHARDT ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES 13 (4th ed. 2013) (discussing the debate surrounding the appropriate authority to interpret and decide
law).
162. See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (granting exemption for religious
family-owned business in complying with the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s requirement that
insurance cover contraception); Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308 (1974) (upholding the
Church Amendment in a sterilization case).
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C. Urgency for Legislatively Promoting a Child’s Best Interest
The conflict between religious freedom and the rights of same-sex couples in the
context of adoption and foster care is extremely polarized politically, oftentimes lacking reasonable discourse regarding the child’s interests. This may be a consequence
of the considerably strong lobbies for both religious freedom and rights for same-sex
couples, or it may be a consequence of the democratic process prompting politicians
to work in favor of those with the power to vote for them (which, of course, are not
children). Still, it may possibly be a consequence of current popular sentiment which
usually sides with either extreme at the expense of children in the middle. Regardless,
this problem cannot be resolved if it continues to be a politicized issue involving
religious freedom against rights for same-sex couples and vice versa, rather than a
children’s issue which impacts thousands of children lacking a comparably strong
voice.
With more than 400,000 children’s lives potentially affected by a state’s decision
regarding their best interest,163 amended legislation is necessary. Religiously affiliated agencies have closed or been seriously challenged on the basis of their beliefs.164
In addition, same-sex couples may abandon their efforts to adopt or foster children
as a result of the current barriers discussed supra. The rise in the quickly developing
field of assisted reproductive technologies165 aiding familial expansion may be less
complex and seemingly less stigmatizing for same-sex couples. Absent legislative
reform of the existing deficient statutes and policies, assisted reproductive technologies could result in a significant, detrimental loss of interest by those who otherwise
would have fostered or adopted children.
Legislative reform is necessary to ensure that a child’s best interest in adoption
and committed foster care placement is not extinguished by subsequent consequences
such as fewer operating agencies or alternative technological methods lacking such
intrusive scrutiny and regulation.166 Improving existing statutes through the proposed
amendments will accomplish several objectives. First, it will allow religious placement agencies to continue their work while abiding by their religious convictions.
Second, it will prevent gross discrimination against same-sex couples, reducing the
likelihood of diminished interest in adoption and foster care. Overall, it will allow for
reasonable facilitation of the child placement process for both same-sex and opposite
sex couples seeking to become adoptive and foster parents, while concurrently respecting religious freedom and equal protection for same-sex couples.

163. See THE AFCARS REPORT, supra note 1.
164. See discussion supra Part IV.D.2.
165. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 703 (discussing the rise in assisted reproductive technology).
166. See e.g., Lyria Bennett Moses, Understanding Legal Responses to Technological Change: The Example of In Vitro Fertilization, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 505, 515-16 (2005) (discussing the potential for samesex couples to turn to assisted reproductive technology should they face significant obstacles in the adoption or
foster care process).
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VI. CONCLUSION
In the context of adoption and foster care placement, the conflict between advocates for religious freedom and advocates for same-sex couples’ rights has oftentimes
rendered the best interest of children subservient to those competing interests. While
this may be an unintended consequence of well-meaning advocacy, the best interest
of children should be placed at the forefront since literature and public consensus
agree that their well-being and future outlook directly correlate with their placement
in a caring, stable, and loving family through adoption or foster care. Most of the
existing legislative mechanisms affecting adoption and foster care placement are deficient in promoting the best interest of children; however, amendments to these statutes can remedy their deficiencies so that a child’s best interest is of a significant
priority, while simultaneously protecting both religious freedom and the rights of
same-sex couples.

